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Abstract: 
In several cantons in Switzerland the regional government, i.e. a set of governors who share the 
executive power in the canton, is elected according to an original voting rule, in which voters can 
vote for several candidates (up to a maximal number of votes). Up to some details, these elections 
are instances of what is known in Social Choice Theory as “Committee Approval Voting”.  
The paper makes use of data from a panel survey collected during the 2011 Zurich cantonal election 
to check whether a strategic voting theory is consistent with individual behaviour observed during 
that election. We show that roughly 70% of the individual decisions on candidates are consistent 
with our model of rational voting. 
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1. Introduction  
In most cantons in Switzerland, the regional government is elected under an original voting rule, 
according to which voters can vote for several candidates in a multi-member, majority election (Lutz 
and Strohmann 1998; Vatter 2002). In multi-member districts, elections usually follow some 
proportional, list-based rule, and majority or plurality elections in multi-member districts are quite 
rare, although they have earlier been used more frequently in the US and in the UK (Cox 1984). There 
are only few examples of current national elections held under such a system, and they are mainly 
limited to two-member districts (Blais and Massicotte 2002). This is for instance the system used at 
the federal level in Switzerland for the election of the upper chamber (e.g., Lachat 2006). However, 
the case on which we focus in this article is remarkable by the large magnitude of the district. In the 
canton of Zurich, on which this paper is based, the seven members of the government are elected in 
a single district. Up to some details, these elections are instances of what is known in Social Choice 
Theory as “Committee Approval Voting”. 
The contribution of this paper is to use and test the theory of individual rational voting under 
Committee Approval proposed in a companion paper (Laslier and Van der Straeten 2014) on real 
election data. For this purpose, we use survey data collected during the election of the canton 
government in Zurich in 2011, and check whether the theory is consistent with individual behaviour. 
We compare the observed voting behaviour with the predictions of our model, regarding both 
aggregate level results (number of votes used, distribution of candidate votes) and individual votes 
(percentage of correct predictions). The model fares quite well in predicting individual level 
observations. Roughly 70% of the individual decisions on candidates are consistent with a model of 
rational voting. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the exact electoral formula, as well as 
the context of the 2011 Zurich regional election. Section 3 describes the predictions of a rational 
voting model in such elections. Section 4 checks whether these predictions are consistent with both 
aggregate results and individual behaviour. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The electoral context 
This study focuses on the election of the regional government in the Swiss canton (the regional unit 
of the Swiss federal state) of Zurich, held in April 2011. In this canton, the government, composed of 
seven members, is elected in a single electoral district. The election is based on a two-round system, 
in which candidates need to reach an “absolute” majority of the votes to be elected in the first 
round.  
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On the first round, citizens can cast as many votes as there are seats to be filled (i.e., up to 
seven votes). However they can also cast fewer votes. “Cumulative voting”, that is, giving several 
votes to the same candidate, is not allowed. Votes can be given to any citizen with the right to vote 
in that election. In other words, votes are not limited to an official list of candidates that would be 
determined before the election. Nonetheless, most votes are concentrated on the well-defined set of 
registered candidates. These are candidates who have been nominated by their respective parties or 
who have made their candidature public in some other way. The possibility to give a vote to any 
eligible citizen however means that a significant proportion of the votes go to additional persons. In 
the April 2011 election, this was the case for 8 per cent of the votes cast.  
Candidates are elected in the first round if they reach some minimal majority threshold (and 
get one of the seven highest numbers of votes). This threshold is equal to the total number of 
candidate votes cast (that is, individual votes for candidates), divided by twice the number of seats, 
and rounded up to the next integer. As most citizens partially abstain by using only part of their 
seven votes, this threshold is substantially lower than one based on the absolute majority of voters. 
That is, as citizens use only part of their votes, a candidate can be elected in the first round while 
being supported by less than half of the citizens.1 In practice, it means that all candidates in Zurich 
are usually elected in the first round. No second round has been necessary in recent history.2 In fact, 
the number of candidates that pass this majority threshold is often larger than the number of seats, 
in which case those with the highest numbers of votes are elected. This observation will be used to 
make some simplifying assumptions when building our theory of strategic voting in this election.3
In the (largely hypothetical) second round, citizens can cast as many votes as there are seats 
that remain to be filled (that is, the total number of seats in the government, minus the number of 
candidates elected in the first round). Like in the first round, votes can be given to any eligible citizen. 
This implies that parties can put forward new candidates in the second round. The candidates with 
the highest numbers of votes are elected. 
 
The election in Zurich took place on April 3, 2011. There were 9 registered candidates, 
competing for the seven seats of the regional executive. They represented six political parties:  
                                                 
1 In the election on which we focus, the majority threshold corresponded to 31% of voters. 
2 This holds for general elections, which take place every four years. However, in the case of partial 
elections following a government member’s resignation, second rounds are more common. 
3 While most other Swiss cantons use a similar electoral system to elect their government, the way in 
which the first round majority threshold is set varies between cantons (Vatter 2002). Most common 
is a more restrictive threshold, equal to the number of valid ballots (and not candidate votes cast), 
divided by two and rounded up to the next integer. With this alternative system, a second round is 
usually necessary. 
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- two left-wing parties: the Social-Democrats (SP) with two candidates and the Greens (GPS) with 
one candidate,  
- two parties in the centre: the Evangelical People’s Party (EVP) and the Christian-Democrats (CVP), 
with one candidate each, 
- two right-wing parties: the Liberals (FDP) with two candidates and further on the right the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP), also with two candidates.  
Table 1 indicates the official results, with the party affiliation of the candidates (Candidates are 
ranked by decreasing scores obtained in the official election). The seven members of the regional 
executive were elected in the first round. Note that among the nine registered candidates, eight 
received more votes than the minimal majority threshold (reported in the last line of Table 1, 84 034 
votes).  
 
Table 1: Official results of the Zurich governmental election, 3 April 2011 
Candidate Votes 
(numbers) 
Result 
Mario Fehr (SP) 137 035 Elected 1st round 
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134 061 Elected 1st round 
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129 943 Elected 1st round 
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129 349 Elected 1st round 
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123 159 Elected 1st round 
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121 144 Elected 1st round 
Martin Graf (GPS) 120 815 Elected 1st round 
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118 487  
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68 996  
Others 93 485  
Number of  candidate votes cast 1 176 474  
Number of voters 273 256  
Majority threshold 84 034  
Note: The total number of voters includes only individuals who casted a valid ballot. 
Source: Statistical office of the canton of Zurich. 
 
3. A simple model of rational voting  
In a companion paper (Laslier and Van der Straeten 2014), we propose a “trembling hand” theory of 
strategic voting under “Committee Approval” in the manner of Myerson and Weber (1993) or Laslier 
(2009). By Committee Approval, we mean a situation where a fixed-sized committee of M members 
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is to be elected from a fixed set of K candidates. Voters vote by casting votes for (“approving”) 
candidates; they can give at most one vote to a candidate (no "cumulative voting"); they can approve 
at most V candidates (in the case of Zurich, V=M). The M candidates with the highest numbers of 
votes are elected. Ties, if any, are randomly broken. We make two main assumptions in our model: 
ASSUMPTION 1: Voters’ preferences over committees are supposed to be additively separable across 
candidates in the following sense: each voter has a utility function for candidates, and her utility for 
any given committee is simply the sum of her utility for the M candidates composing this committee. 
Besides, when voting, voters are purely instrumental (no expressive motives). 
ASSUMPTION 2 (“trembling ballot” assumption): There exists a tiny probability that any vote might be 
mis-recorded: any YES vote for a candidate can wrongly be recorder as a NO vote, and symmetrically, 
any NO vote for a candidate can wrongly be recorder as a YES vote. Mistakes are independent across 
candidates and across voters. This assumption guarantees that whatever the profile of ballots cast by 
the voters, all electoral outcomes (realized scores of candidates) have a positive probability. 
 
How should a rational voter vote under such assumptions? In rational models of strategic voting, 
voters cast their votes anticipating their influence on the outcome. The first step of reasoning for a 
voter is therefore to consider all the events (that is, the distribution of other voters’ votes) such that 
she is in a position to cast a decisive vote. Indeed, whenever she is not pivotal, the same set of 
candidates is elected whatever her ballot is, and thus all actions yield the same payoff. She then 
needs to assess the likelihood of these pivot-events, to be able to compute the expected utility 
associated to each possible ballot. We show that under these assumptions, a rational voter should 
act as follows (Proposition 11 in Laslier and Van der Straeten 2014): 
 
• Step 1: Given her anticipations about the behaviour of other voters, the voter identifies the 
set of candidates she expects to be elected (denoted by c₁ to cM) or not (denoted by cM+1 to cK), 
according to the scores she expects for them:4
 
 
• Step 2: For 1≤k≤M, define candidate cK‘s “main contender” as cM+1, and for M+1≤k≤K, define 
candidate cK‘s “main contender” as cM. 
• Step 3: The voter ranks the candidates according to (the inverse of) their distance, in terms of 
expected votes, to their main contender. 
                                                 
4 We use a slight change in notation compared to Laslier and Van der Straeten 2014. Here, we drop 
the (voter) index indicating that the voter’s anticipations take into account the ballots of all the other 
voters, but not her own. We do not believe it may create any confusion.  
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• Step 4: The voter considers all the candidates in turn, according to the priority order defined 
at Step 3. As long as the voter does not hit the vote-budget constraint (V votes), she votes for 
a candidate if and only if her utility for this candidate is larger than her utility for its main 
contender. 
 
Notice the importance of the two pivotal candidates: the weakest expected winner (cM) and the 
strongest expected loser (cM+1). The intuitive content of this rule is the following: the elected 
committee will probably be {c₁..... cM}.  But if something different happens due to my vote, what can 
it be? If one of the expected winners were to be replaced in the set of winners by a losing candidate, 
this losing candidate is most likely to be cM+1, the one with the largest score. Therefore in order to 
decide whether I want to approve an expected winner or not, I should compare it to its main 
contender cM+1. Consider now the expected losers. Who is their “main contender”? Their main 
contender is the weakest expected winner cM, and the same reasoning leads me to compare the 
expected losers to the expected weakest winner cM. Note that the two types of reasoning concur 
with respect to cM and cM+1 themselves: I approve the one I prefer, and not the other.  
Given the limited number of votes I have, I consider the candidates lexicographically, in the order 
defined in Step 3. In this order, candidates are ranked according to their distance to their most likely 
contender (in numbers of expected votes). This is equivalent to ranking them by decreasing 
probability of them being caught in a tie for election. Indeed, our trembling ballot assumption implies 
that the most likely pivot-event is a tie between the two candidates who are expected to rank M-th 
and M+1-th (here candidates cM and cM+1). What is the next most likely pivot-event? Note that all the 
other pivot events imply some order reversals among candidates, compared to the expected order. 
What is the next pair of candidates between which the voter is most likely to be pivotal? Our 
assumptions imply that it will be either the pair {cM, cM+2} or the pair {cM-1, cM+1}, depending on 
whether the difference in expected scores between cM and cM+2 is larger or smaller than the 
difference in expected scores between cM-1 and cM+1. Indeed, they are the two pairs which require the 
less order reversals compared to the expected outcome. Similarly, other pivot-events can be ranked 
by decreasing probability of occurrence.  
 
Note that the rule used in Zurich differs from “pure” Committee Approval on a number of 
dimensions: 
1. In Zurich, there exists a minimal majority threshold to be elected in the first round. If some 
seats remain to be filled after the first round, a second round is organized. 
2. In Zurich, the candidates include both registered “official” candidates and non-registered 
candidates.  
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These points are not taken into account in Laslier and Van der Straeten (2014) but we will see, in 
view of the data, that they can in fact be safely neglected.  
 
4. An empirical evaluation of the rational model 
 
4.1 Data 
Our analysis is based on data collected as part of the research project Making Electoral Democracy 
Work (Blais 2010). A two-wave panel survey was conducted on the occasion of the parliamentary and 
governmental elections (to be held on April, 3rd 2011). Respondents were interviewed in the last two 
weeks before the election, and again in the week following the election. 1192 respondents 
completed the pre-electoral wave and among these, 842 also completed the second questionnaire.5
In order to test our strategic voting model, we need information about citizens’ candidate 
preferences, on their anticipations about the scores of the candidates, and on their actual vote 
choice. Vote choice was measured either in the pre-electoral wave or in the post-electoral wave, 
depending on when respondents cast their vote. Advance postal voting is widespread and about half 
of the respondents in the pre-electoral wave had already voted. We assess respondents’ voting 
choices using the following question: 
 
These surveys were conducted online by Harris International, relying on a panel of respondents from 
the Swiss polling firm Link. The sampling was based on a stratified, quota-based approach. Quotas 
were set by controlling for age, gender and education status. The participation rate was 36% in the 
pre-electoral wave and 71% in the post-electoral wave. 
For the cantonal government election you had up to 7 votes. Which candidates did you vote 
for? (up to 7 answers possible) 
− Regine Aeppli (SP) 
− Ursula Gut (FDP) 
− Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 
− Ernst Stocker (SVP) 
− Markus Kägi (SVP) 
− Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 
− Mario Fehr (SP) 
− Maja Ingold (EVP) 
− Martin Graf (Greens) 
− Other candidate 
− Don’t know  
 
                                                 
5 These figures exclude respondents who started but did not complete the corresponding wave(s). 
They also exclude respondents who were disqualified on the basis of quality measures, seeking to 
identify those respondents who appear unengaged, for example by giving illogical responses or by 
completing the survey too quickly. 
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To construct individual preferences over the candidates, we use the following battery of 
questions from the pre-electoral wave: 
Please rate each of the following candidates on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you 
strongly dislike that candidate and 10 means that you strongly like that candidate.  
 
There was no question in the survey on the respondents’ anticipations about the electoral 
outcomes. We will explain in section 4.2 the assumptions we make about these anticipations. Given 
that some respondents had already voted at the time of the first interview, our sample is not limited 
to respondents who participated in both panel waves. Out of the 1192 respondents, 502 can be 
included in the analysis. 451 respondents are excluded because they did not vote and 239 (among 
voters) because they did not evaluate one or several candidates. Table 2 compares the electoral 
scores of the registered candidates in the official election and in our sample.  
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of votes for the registered candidates in the official election and in the sample 
 Official election 
Scores 
Sample Scores Sample  
relative bias 
Candidates Nb of votes % of voters Nb of votes % of voters in %** 
Mario Fehr (SP) 137 035 50.15 298 
 
59.36 +18% 
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134 061 49.06 268 53.39 +9% 
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129 943 47.55 221 44.02 -7% 
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129 349 47.34 257 51.20 +8% 
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123 159 45.07 202 40.24 -11% 
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121 144 44.33 272 54.18 +22% 
Martin Graf (GPS) 120 815 44.21 269 53.59 +21% 
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118 487 43.36 263 52.39 +21% 
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68 996 25.25 154 30.68 +22% 
Average nb of votes per 
ballot* 
3.96 4.39  
Number of voters 273 256 502 
* The average number of votes per ballot is computed restricting attention to the nine registered 
candidates.   
** The sample relative bias of a candidate is the difference between the score of the candidate in the 
sample and the score of the candidate in the official election, divided by the score of the candidate in 
the official election. 
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When comparing the scores of the candidates in the official election and in our sample, we 
observe that, in our sample, all candidates except the ones from the SVP (the mot right-wing party) 
get higher scores than in the official elections. As shown in the last column of Table 2, the bias is 
moderate for the two FDP (moderate right) candidates (about 8 or 9%), and is larger for the 
remaining centre and left wing candidates (around 20%).  The fact that there exists a left-wing bias in 
our sample will not be problematic when testing our model, since, as will become clear in the 
empirical strategy section, all our analyses will be conducted at the individual level: the objective is 
to check whether each individual in our sample casts votes which are consistent with the 
recommendation of the rational model.  
 
Our analysis will focus on explaining the votes for the registered candidates. Indeed,  we have 
very little information about non registered citizens who receive votes. We do not have voters’ 
evaluations of these persons, and their nominal vote counts are not even recorded in the official 
election results. This is why in Table 2 we ignore the non-registered candidates. In particular, when 
computing the average number of votes per ballot, we only consider the votes cast for registered 
candidates. The number for the official election is computed using the figures in Table 1 and is equal 
to 3.96 votes per ballot.6
We will explain when describing our empirical strategy why ignoring the non-registered 
persons will not bias the way we study the votes for the registered candidates (simply denoted 
hereafter by “the candidates”). 
 In our sample, the average number of votes for registered candidates per 
ballot is 4.39, which is larger than what is observed in the official election (3.96). Therefore our 
sample slightly overestimates the number of votes per ballot (+11%).  The most plausible explanation 
for this higher number of votes is that we only keep voters who were able to evaluate all 9 
candidates, thus restricting attention to well informed voters. Since there is some evidence 
suggesting that lack of information about the candidates is correlated with casting fewer votes (see 
Lachat and Kriesi, 2013), selecting the more informed voters may be responsible for this bias. 
 
Figure 1 provides more information about the number of votes cast by respondents in our 
sample, by showing the distribution of the numbers of votes per ballot (still restricting attention to 
the nine registered candidates).   
 
 
                                                 
6 There were 273 256 voters, casting 1 176 474 votes, 93 485 of which for non-registered candidates 
(see Table 1). Not taking into account the votes for non-registered candidates, the number of votes 
per ballot is equal to (1 176 474-93 485)/273 256=3.96. If non-registered candidates were included, 
this number would be 4.31 (1 176 474/273 256). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the number of votes per ballot (in % of ballots) 
 
 
Note that the modal number of votes per ballot is 7 (23% of the ballots). Ballots with a single 
name are the least frequent (7%).  
Lastly, Table 3 provides the means and the standard deviations of the evaluations received by 
the candidates (on a 0-10 scale).  
 
Table 3: Evaluations and scores of the registered candidates in the sample 
 Sample 
Evaluations 
Sample 
Electoral scores 
Candidates Mean Standard 
deviation 
% of voters 
Mario Fehr (SP) 5.54 3.27 
 
59.36 
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 5.39 2.64 
 
53.39 
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 4.48 3.40 
 
44.02 
Ursula Gut (FDP) 5.12 2.74 
 
51.20 
Markus Kägi (SVP) 4.33 3.35 40.24 
Regine Aeppli (SP) 5.11 3.09 
 
54.18 
Martin Graf (GPS) 5.31 3.17 
 
53.59 
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 5.16 2.66 
 
52.39 
Maja Ingold (EVP) 4.38 2.86 30.68 
 
We observe a strong correlation (coefficient 0.92) between the electoral score and the mean 
evaluation of the candidates.  
6,9 
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4.2 Empirical method 
For each voter, we will compute the strategic recommendation as defined in Section 3, and compare 
it to his/her actual vote. For the time being, we restrict our attention to the registered candidates 
(we will explain below why we can safely do so). As explained above, to vote strategically, voters 
must start by anticipating the expected scores of the different candidates in order to evaluate the 
likelihood that they might get involved in a tie (or a near tie). We assume that they form anticipations 
which are on average perfect. That is, their anticipations are such that the average expected scores 
of the candidates coincide with the official scores. (In the Appendix  we present results from a series 
of replications, in which expectations about candidate chances are based on poll results instead).  
 
Table 4 presents all the information needed to establish the strategic recommendation for each 
voter, in particular: 
• Step 1: It establishes the set of expected winners (shaded in light grey) and of expected 
losers (shaded in darker grey), based on the number of votes they received in the official 
election (Column 2) and the associated rank (Column 3). Recall that all the first 7 candidates 
were elected in the first round (See Table 1). In particular, the names of the two critical 
candidates: the weakest expected winner (Martin Graf) and the strongest expected winner 
(Hans Hollenstein) are written in bold characters and underlined.  
• Step 2: For each candidate, Column 4 identifies his/her main contender. If the candidate is 
expected to be a winner, its main contender is the strongest expected loser (here Hans 
Hollenstein), whereas if a candidate is expected to be a loser, its main contender is the 
weakest expected winner (here Martin Graf).  
• Step 3: Using the distance (in expected scores) between each candidate and his/her main 
contender (Column 5), one can derive the priority order in which order the voters should 
consider the candidates (Column 6). 
 
Note that in Section 3, a voter’s anticipations are defined taking all other voters’ votes into account, 
but not taking into account her own vote. Therefore, in full rigor, each voter should form a similar 
table, where the computations are made excluding her own vote. Given the scores obtained by the 
candidates, this would not change the ordering of candidates, nor the strategic recommendation. We 
therefore reason for all voters on the basis of the figures given in Table 4. 
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Table 4: information needed to establish the strategic recommendation  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Candidates Number 
of votes 
Rank in 
official 
election 
Main 
contender 
Distance to 
main 
contender 
(nb of votes) 
Priority 
order 
Mario Fehr (SP) 137 035 1 
 
H. Hollenstein 18 548 7 
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 134 061 2 
 
H. Hollenstein 15 574 6 
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 129 943 3 
 
H.Hollenstein 11 456 5 
Ursula Gut (FDP) 129 349 4 
 
H.Hollenstein 10 862 4 
Markus Kägi (SVP) 123 159 5 
 
H.Hollenstein 4 672 3 
Regine Aeppli (SP) 121 144 6 
 
H. Hollenstein 2 657 2 
Martin Graf (GPS) 120 815 7 
 
H. Hollenstein 2 328 1 
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 118 487 8 M. Graf 2 328 1 
Maja Ingold (EVP) 68 996 9 M. Graf 51 819 8 
Others 93 485     
 
 
Once the main contender and the priority order of each candidate have been established, Step 4 of 
the strategic recommendation easily follows: The voter considers all the candidates in turn, 
according to the priority order defined in Column 6. As long as the voter does not hit the vote-budget 
constraint (7 votes at most), she votes for a candidate if and only if her utility for this candidate is 
larger than her utility for its main contender. 
 
So far, we have neglected non-registered citizens who received votes. Although non-registered 
names receive a substantial number of votes (93 485 votes, see last line of Table 4), these votes are 
dispersed on many different names. It is not possible to know how many votes the strongest “other” 
candidate received, as these votes are not broken down by individual candidates in the vote counting 
process. Yet, given that there was no other serious candidate besides the nine official ones, we can 
be confident that the distance between any of these persons and their main contender (in their case 
the weakest expected winner Martin Graf) is much larger than all the distances computed for 
registered candidates. Therefore, their probability to be part of a pivot-event is negligible compared 
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to those of the registered candidates. Introducing these candidates in the above analysis would not 
alter the strategic recommendation regarding the vote for (or against) the registered candidates.  
 
In the above analysis, we have also neglected the minimal majority threshold that a candidate needs 
to reach in order to be elected at the first round. What happens to the strategic reasoning described 
so far if one explicitly takes into account this majority requirement? There are now two types of 
pivot-event featuring candidate c: 
(i) There exists another candidate c' such that candidates c and c‘ are caught in a tie (or a near tie) for 
the M=7th rank, and both of them are above the majority threshold. In this case, the voter is pivotal 
in changing the chances of candidates c and c‘ to be elected at the first round; 
(ii) Candidate c is ranked M=7th or above, and he gets a number of votes (from other voters) equal to 
the threshold majority minus one vote. In that case, by voting for this candidate, the voter is able to 
make him a first round winner rather than having him being a first round loser (who might still be 
elected on the second round though). 
So far, we have neglected type (ii) events. We defend this simplification by noting that the first 
8 candidates are all well above this threshold, and that their distance to the threshold is much larger 
than the distance to their main contender (See Table 1). The exception is the candidate ranked 9th 
(Maja Ingold). She is below the majority threshold and the distance to the majority threshold is larger 
than her distance to her main contender (who is above the threshold). For this candidate, the most 
likely type (i) event is that there is a tie (or almost tie) with the candidate ranked 7th (Martin Graf). 
And the most likely events where she ties (or almost ties) with candidate Martin Graf entails that she 
receives more votes that Hans Hollenstein, in which case she will be above the majority threshold. 
For a type (ii) event to happen, both candidates 7 and 8 need to fall below the majority threshold, 
which requires many more mistakes. The latter is therefore much less likely than the former. 7
 
 
Finally, we need to explain how we deal with the case of a respondent who gives the same 
evaluation (on a 0 to 10 scale) to a candidate and to his main contender (see section 4.1 for the 
definition of these evaluations). Consider a voter who has not used all her seven votes yet, and still 
have some (registered) candidates to consider according to the algorithm described above. Suppose 
that she now has to compare candidate c to his most likely contender, and that, in the survey, the 
                                                 
7 We only provide quite informal arguments in this paragraph. Developing more formal arguments 
would be complicated by the fact that any mistake (mis-recorded vote) on a candidate impacts both 
the individual score of this candidate and the majority threshold. More precisely, if a YES vote for a 
candidate is wrongly recorder as a NO vote, it decreases by one vote the score of this candidate, and 
it decreases the majority threshold by about 1/14 (see the definition of the majority threshold in 
Section 2). We will simply consider that voters neglect the possibility of a second round. 
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voter gives the same evaluation to both candidates. This situation has two possible interpretations: 
either the voter is perfectly and exactly indifferent between the two candidates, or she actually 
prefers one candidate over the other, but given the finite 11-point scale, she is bound to give them 
the same evaluation. We consider the latter explanation as being more plausible, and we decide to 
treat that case in the following way. Each voter in the sample is duplicated 99 times. For each of 
these 100 observations corresponding to a single voter, if she happens to give the same evaluation to 
any two candidates c and c’, the reported indifferences between candidates c and c’ are broken 
randomly, where each strict preference is assigned the same probability.  
 
4.3 Results 
Our aim is to assess to which degree the votes cast in the 2011 Zurich elections fit with the 
predictions of our rational voting model. We look at the model predictions from two different angles: 
aggregate level predictions, and individual-level predictions.  
 
Aggregate predictions of the model We first study the aggregate predictions of the rational model. 
Figure 2 indicates for each candidate the observed and predicted scores, in our sample.   
 
Figure 2: Candidate scores, observed and predicted (% of voters)  
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Observe in Figure 2 that the strategic model performs quite well in explaining the electoral 
scores in the sample. The largest relative error is observed for the last candidate, Maja Ingold, where 
the strategic model over-predicts her score.  
It is noteworthy that the “M+1 rule”, according to which voters should concentrate on a group 
of top candidates, the size of which is equal to the district magnitude (M) plus one (Cox 1997), does 
not apply here. All candidates including the ninth candidate can get a significant number of votes.  
 
Regarding the predictions about the number of votes per ballot, the average predicted number 
of votes per ballot is 4.23, against 4.39 in the sample; there is thus a slight under-prediction of the 
average number of votes. As can be seen in Figure 3, the predicted distribution is hump-shaped and 
fails to predict the mode of the observed distribution at 7 votes per ballot: compared to the rational 
recommendation, too many full ballots are cast in the sample. 
 
Figure 3: Number of votes per ballot (in %)  
 
 
Individual level analysis In the survey, we have 502 respondents who have answered all the 
evaluation questions and the vote question. Given that nine candidates are registered, we have 
502*9= 4 518 voter*candidate observations.  
Table 5 provides (last column) the percentage of correct prediction for each candidate, and on 
average (last line). One sees that the overall average percentage of correct prediction is 69%  
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Table 5: Percentage of correct predictions, per candidate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
  
% of positive 
predictions 
% of correct 
predictions 
among 
positive 
predictions 
% of 
negative 
predictions 
% of correct 
predictions 
among 
negative 
predictions 
Average % 
of correct 
predictions  
Mario Fehr (SP) 
Thomas Heiniger (FDP) 
Ernst Stocker (SVP) 
Ursula Gut (FDP) 
Markus Kägi (SVP) 
Regine Aeppli (SP) 
Martin Graf (GPS) 
Hans Hollenstein (CVP) 
Maja Ingold (EVP) 
Average 
55 84 45 70 78 
52 64 48 59 62 
42 73 58 77 75 
49 63 51 60 61 
39 70 61 79 75 
50 78 50 70 74 
52 78 48 73 76 
48 63 52 58 60 
36 36 64 72 59 
47 69 53 69 69 
  
 
This overall average number can be decomposed by candidate and by the sign of the strategic 
recommendation (positive: “Vote for the candidate”, or negative: “Don’t vote for this candidate”). 
Table 5 also provides such decompositions. Column 2 indicates the number of positive predictions for 
each candidate, and column 3 indicates the percentage of correct predictions among such positive 
predictions. Column 4 indicates the number of negative predictions for each candidate, and column 5 
indicates the percentage of correct predictions among such negative predictions. We observe that on 
average (see the last line in the table), the percentage of correct predictions is the same whether the 
strategic recommendation was to vote NO (negative prediction) or to vote YES (positive prediction) 
for a candidate. Consistently with the observation made on Figure 2 that the rational model over-
predicts the score of the EVP candidate Maja Ingold, we observe in Table 5 that in cases where a 
voter was predicted to vote for her, only 36% were observed to do so. This is the only cell in Table 5 
where the percentage of correct predictions falls below 50%. 
 
Last, we construct a general indicator of individual rationality by counting, for each individual, 
the number of votes correctly predicted in his/her ballot. Figure 4 below depicts the distribution of 
this indicator. 
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Figure 4: Number of correct predictions in the ballot (% of ballots 
 
 
Although we observe that only 6.5% of the ballots are fully consistent with the nine rational 
recommendations, we see than in almost half of the ballots (47.7%) the number of correct 
predictions is at least 7 (out of 9 votes).   
In view of these results, we conclude that the rational model performs fairly well in explaining 
individual voting decisions. 
 
Discussion: Strategic versus sincere voting? As noticed in Laslier and Van der Straeten 2014, in 
theory, strategic voting may entail casting non-sincere ballots (Proposition 4). How often does it 
happen in this specific election? According to the usual definition in the Approval Voting literature 
(Brams 1982), define a ballot as sincere if it satisfies the following condition: if a voter votes for a 
candidate she also votes for all the candidates to which she gives a strictly higher evaluation.  
We are going to show that in this election, in most cases, the strategic recommendation satisfies this 
notion of sincerity.  
 
Consider first the first eight candidates (the seven expected winners plus the strongest expected 
loser). All these candidates have a priority order of at most 7 (Table 4, Column 6), which means that 
the constraint on the number of votes (the voter is allowed to cast at most M=7 votes) is not binding 
when the voter decides whether to vote for these candidates or not. It is straightforward to check 
that if the strategic recommendation implies voting for one of these eight candidates, it also implies 
voting for all the candidates with higher evaluation. Indeed, if the voter prefers Hans Hollenstein (the 
strongest expected loser) to Martin Graf (the weakest expected winner), she should vote (among 
those eight candidates) for all candidates she prefers to Hollenstein plus Hollenstein, whereas if she 
prefers Martin Graf to Hans Hollenstein, she should vote (among those eight candidates) for all 
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candidates she prefers to Hollenstein (but not for Hollenstein). In both cases, it implies sincere voting 
among the set of the top eight candidates.  
Now consider the last candidate, Maja Ingold. There are only two types of situations where sincerity 
can be violated: 
(1) The voter has used her seven votes when considering the first 8 candidates, and she has no vote 
left to vote for Maja Ingold, even if she likes her better than Martin Graf (her main contender) and 
some of the expected winner she has already voted for.  
(2) The voter still has (at least) one vote left, and there exists an expected winner c other than Martin 
Graf such that the voter has the following ranking in her utility for the candidates: 
u(Hollenstein)>u(c)>u(Ingold)>u(Graf); in that case, the voter should vote for Ingold (since she 
prefers Ingold to her main contender Graf), but not vote for the expected winner c (since she likes c 
less than its main contender Hollenstein). 
 
This example is useful in that it illustrates the two potential causes as to why the strategic 
recommendation might not be sincere in general: 
(1) The constraint on the number of votes is binding, 
(2) The expected winners are compared to the strongest expected losers, whereas the expected 
losers are compared to the weakest expected winner (note that is all candidates where compared to 
the same benchmark, sincere voting would result – neglecting the constraint on the number of 
votes). 
 
It turns out that in our data, the strategic recommendation quite often leads to a sincere ballot. We 
computed that in over 90% of our voters in the sample, the strategic model predicts that the voter 
should cast a sincere ballot. 
In case the strategic model predicts a violation of sincerity, it is interesting, to get a more precise 
quantification of this violation, to compute the number of pairs of candidates on which sincerity is 
violated, where we say that sincerity is violated on a set {c,c’} of any two candidates if and only if the 
voter votes for one candidate and does not vote for the other, although she prefers the latter to the 
former. Table 6 below reports the distribution of the number of pairs which violates sincerity. 
  
Table 6: Distribution of the number of pairs violating sincerity per ballot (in % of ballots) 
Number of pairs in a ballot  
which violate sincerity 
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
% of ballots 90.2 3.2 3.6 2.0 0.6 0.4 100 
 
19 
 
Table 6 reads as follows: 90.2% of the strategic ballots display no violation of sincerity. 3.2% of the 
strategic ballots are such that in these ballots, sincerity is violated for one and only one pair of 
candidates… When one computes the percentage of pairs (and not ballots) which violate sincerity, 
one gets 0.57%.  
 
Contrary to what happens in a uni-nominal single-member district elections (M=1) where strategic 
voting contradicts sincerity whenever a voter’s preferred candidate is not one of the two main front-
runners, we observe that in this election in a multi-member district with multiple votes, the strategic 
recommendation does not violate in practice a basic notion of sincerity. Note that this low number is 
related to the fact that the number of candidates (9) is very close to the number of seats (M=7). 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The way canton governments are elected in Switzerland provides an interesting case study of multi-
nominal, approval-type, voting. We concentrated on the Zurich cantonal election, where 7 
candidates have to be elected, and voters are allowed to cast a vote in favor of up to 7 candidates.  
For the 2011 election, a pre-electoral survey was conducted, which allows linking individual 
level votes and preferences. We took advantage of these data to study the predictions of the rational 
voting paradigm, in this context. We proved that rational optimization often suggest the voter to 
approve of many candidates, a theoretical conclusion that matches the observation. In the details of 
the individual approvals, the explanatory power of the rational model that we tested is of the order 
of 70%. 
These results are encouraging in the sense that a purely theoretical model was able to render a 
good part of non-trivial facts. But we would like to stress here that the election under study had 
some distinguished and original features, which call for caution when generalizing our findings about 
the good performance of the strategic model to other contexts.  
The first point is that the number of candidates in 2011 was such that most of them were to be 
elected: 7 out of 9. As seen above, this fact led to a noticeable feature of the strategic model in that 
specific election: its predictions rarely contradict some basic notion of sincerity. The second point is 
that no candidate was clearly sure to be elected: the final score of the best-elected candidate was 
not so different from the score of the 8-th ranked candidate. These specific features are such that 
more applied analysis of the same kind would be welcome. 
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APPENDIX: Alternative assumptions about the anticipations  
 
In the strategic model, two candidates play a key role: the weakest expected winner and the 
strongest expected loser. The voter’s decision is based on a comparison of the expected winners with 
the strongest expected loser, and of the expected losers with the weakest expected winner. In the 
official results of the 2011 Zurich election, the scores received by the different candidates were very 
close. In particular, the weakest winner (Martin Graf) receives the vote of 44% of the voters, while 
the strongest loser (Hans Hollenstein) receives the votes of 43% of the voters, the vote gap being of 
only 2 328 votes (see Table 2). Moreover, the scores of the other candidates are also quite close, 
since the candidate receiving the highest score (Mario Fehr) receives the votes of 50% of the voters. 
Only the weakest candidate of all (Maja Ingold) receives substantially fewer votes (25%). So it might 
have been very difficult for voters to correctly predict the expected scores of the different 
candidates. Indeed, some evidence for this difficulty is provided by the results of a poll, which was 
conducted by IsoPublic on March 22 2011, that is, two weeks before the first round of the election 
(April 3). Table A1 below reports the results of this poll, together with the official results. 
 
Table A1: Score, Rank, Main contender, Distance from main contender and resulting priority rank, 
for each candidate, using as the basis for anticipations the official results and the poll results  
  Official  
 
Poll 
Candidates % Rank Main  
contender 
Distance 
to main 
contender 
(% points) 
Priority 
Order 
% Rank Main  
contender 
Distance 
to main 
contender 
(% points) 
Priority 
Order 
Mario Fehr 
(SP) 
50 1 H. Hollenstein 7 7 46 3 M. Kägi 11 5 
Thomas 
Heiniger (FDP) 
49 2 H. Hollenstein 6 6 43 4 M. Kägi 8 4 
Ernst Stocker 
(SVP) 
48 3 H. Hollenstein 5 5 40 6 M. Kägi 5 2 
Ursula Gut 
(FDP) 
48 4 H. Hollenstein 5 4 41 5 M. Kägi 6 3 
Markus Kägi 
(SVP) 
45 5 H. Hollenstein 2 3 35 8 M. Graf 4 1 
Regine Aeppli 
(SP) 
44 6 H. Hollenstein 1 2 49 1 M. Kägi 14 7 
Martin Graf 
(GPS) 
44 7 H. Hollenstein 1 1 39 7 M. Kägi 4 1 
H. Hollenstein 
(CVP) 
43 8 M. Graf 1 1 48 2 M. Kägi 13 6 
Maja Ingold 
(EVP) 
25 9 M. Graf 19 8 19 9 M. Graf 20 8 
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The poll correctly predicts the low score of Maja Ingold, who is ranked last. It also put Martin 
Graf as the weakest winner, which is correct. However, the poll suggests that Markus Kägi should be 
the strongest loser (although he was elected and finished at rank 5). These poll results show that it 
was probably a complicated task for the voters to correctly predict the scores of the candidates, and 
the resulting priority order used to derive the strategic recommendation. Table A1 also provides, for 
each candidate, the identity of its main contender, as well as its priority rank, based on both the 
official results and the poll results. 
 
We have replicated the main analysis with these poll results instead of the official results as 
the basis for the anticipations (Detailed results available upon request).  
In terms of the overall number of correct predictions at the individual level, the results based 
on polls are similar to those based on official results. The overall average percentage of correct 
predictions with the polls is 68% (69% with official results, see Table 5).  
One of the most noticeable differences, however, is the predicted number of votes per ballot. 
Using the official results, we predicted an average of 4.23 votes, which is only slightly below the 
observed average of 4.39 votes. Using poll results, in contrast, the model predicts more candidate 
votes by citizen, with an average of 4.9. The predicted number of full or almost full ballots (with 6 or 
7 votes) is substantially larger compared to the main model. This is a consequence of having a far-
right candidate as the strongest expected loser (i.e., Markus Kägi from the SVP), instead of a centrist 
candidate with the official results (Hans Hollenstein). The strongest expected winner is the main 
contender for most candidates. Since Markus Kägi enjoys a relatively low level of sympathy in our 
sample compared to Hans Hollenstein (see Table 3), the rational voting model predicts more votes on 
average for the other candidates, and thus more votes per ballot. These remarks highlight the facts 
that the precise consequences of the strategic recommendations (e.g. number of votes per ballot) 
are quite sensitive to the identity of the two critical candidates (the weakest expected winner and 
the strongest expected loser). 
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